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1. Introduction.  
 
This paper is a defense of downward (or top-down) causation and, along with this, 
a discussion of levels—why we sometimes find it useful to think in terms of this notion 
and what its limitations might be.  The connection between these topics arises in part 
because words like “downward” and “top-down” suggest a picture according to which the 
world is organized into “levels” with downward causation involving causes that are at a 
higher level than their effects. One possible view (see. e.g., Eronen, 2013) is that talk of 
levels makes no clear sense; if so, whatever might be involved in (what we call) top-
down causation, it can’t literally be causation from an upper to lower level. Put 
differently, it might seem that a prior challenge facing anyone who talks of downward 
causation is to provide an account of levels according to which talk of upper and lower 
levels makes sense and then evaluate whether there is causation from the former to the 
latter.   
  For a number of reasons I’m not going to proceed in this way. Although I think 
that level notions do legitimate work and thus that we should not try to dispense with 
them, I also doubt that there is any single, consistent account that captures everything that 
people have had in mind in talking of levels. My view is that levels talk reflects a number 
of different considerations that are sometimes mutually reinforcing but also can push us 
to make very different—indeed inconsistent—judgments in assignments of levels. 
Privileging just one of these notions is likely to seem arbitrary and in any case will fail to 
do justice to the variety of motivations that underlie levels talk. It is also true, however,   
that these different notions are interrelated in various complex ways2.  My focus in this 
 
1 Thanks to Sara Green, Bob Batterman and Bill Wimsatt for helpful comments on an 
earlier version. Green’s paper in the present volume as well as Green and Batterman 
(2017) and Green (2018) provide many additional examples of downward causation and 
of modeling across levels (or scales) in biology.  Batterman’s paper in this volume 
provides a number of illustrations of how talk of levels is tied to claims about scale 
separation and  relative informational autonomy (closely connected to what I call 
conditional independence) and how, at the same time, in multi-scale modeling it is 
important to understand how information can be passed across scales.  I see this work as 
complementing my own discussion.     
2 The extent to which different criteria for level assignment lead to largely the same 
results (or not) is an important question on which I touch only in passing. There is a range 
of possible positions. One might think that, properly understood, different notions of 
level or criteria for level assignment produce judgments about levels that largely 
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paper  will be on three (of many possible) ways of thinking about levels, which I believe 
illustrate these claims: 
 
(1.1) A notion rooted in compositional or part/whole relationships. 
 
(1.2) A notion tied to ideas about independence (including what I will call 
conditional independence) and along with this, strategies for coarse 
graining and dimension reduction.   
 
(1.3)     Closely related to this, a notion based on considerations of computational  
and epistemic tractability.  
 
As I will try to illustrate, lack of clarity about the relation between these different 
level notions is one reason why the notion of downward causation has seemed 
problematic. Conversely, thinking about downward causation provides a very useful 
point of entry into various ways of thinking about levels.  
My discussion is organized as follows: I begin (Section 2) with some brief 
remarks about the notions of level that will concern me. Section 3 explores what might be 
meant by downward causation.  Sections 4-5 describe some examples which scientists 
have found it natural to describe in terms of downward causation. Sections 6-7 consider 
several objections that philosophers have advanced against the possibility of downward 
causation.  I will argue that these objections are either misguided or do not apply to the   
examples in question. A crucial part of my argument will be that the putative examples of 
downward causation on which critics have focused are not, for the most part, what 
scientists have had in mind in talking of downward causation—the critics’ objections do 
not apply to the examples that I give of downward causation. In particular, one idea to 
which I will be objecting is a picture according to which top-down causation involves a 
whole causally affecting its parts. I agree that, at least in many of the cases the critics 
have discussed, this is incoherent but I also don’t think it is what one should understand 
by downward causation.     
Once I have sorted out these issues about downward causation, I will then 
introduce the notion of conditional independence (Section 8) and use it to motivate some 
general remarks about levels. Talk of levels is ubiquitous in science and this raises a 
number of questions: Most obviously there is the question of what might be meant by 
such talk. A related question concerns the legitimate function (if any) of such talk. Why 
do scientists apparently find such talk useful? What work does it do? Does it frequently 
mislead us, as some critics claim? I address such questions in Sections 9-10. 
 
 
 
coincide. I believe this may be Bill Wimsatt’s view. At the other extreme one might think 
that the different criteria lead to results that diverge so much that they render talk of 
levels useless and misleading. My view is somewhere in the middle between these two 
possibilities, but closer to Wimsatt’s views than those of the complete level skeptics. 
Thanks to Wimsatt for pushing me on this point.  
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2. Levels3  
 
2.1. Levels as Compositional. One familiar notion of “level” is  compositional or 
mereological: objects or entities at a higher level are “composed” or “constituted by” 
objects at lower levels in a way that generates a hierarchy. Here “composed” means that 
the lower level objects are (or at least are thought of as) “parts” of higher-level objects—
or at least this is the paradigmatic notion of constitution.4 Textbooks provide familiar 
illustrations of this idea. Atoms are composed of protons, neutrons and electrons, 
molecules are composed of atoms, cells are composed of molecules, multicellular 
organisms are composed of cells, and so on. This is sometimes described as a “wedding 
cake” model of levels, since reality is regarded as divided into distinct “layers” based on 
part-whole relationships. We find this idea (among others) in Putnam and Oppenheim’s 
classic paper (1958) and it often seems to be the preferred conception of levels among 
metaphysically inclined philosophers. It is this notion of level that (I believe) underlies 
many philosophical objections to downward causation, since it encourages the idea that 
this involves causation from a whole to its parts.  
 
2.2. Levels and Independence.  Another notion of level is tied to claims about 
independence where (as I will understand this) it is a matter of relations among variables. 
(More pedantically, it is a relation among what in the world corresponds to variables—
e.g., magnitudes such as mass and charge but for brevity I will write “variables” in what 
follows.) According to this conception, variables X and Y are at different levels when the 
behavior of X is in some sense “independent” of the values taken by Y, so that we can 
ignore (or largely ignore or ignore in many cases) X in constructing a causal explanation 
of Y, appealing instead to other variables at some different level. This notion of level is 
often tied to considerations having to do with the role of “scales”—spatial, temporal and 
energetic – in constructing theories and models: sometimes when nature is kind we have 
“separation” or near separation of scales, so that what happens at one length or energy 
scale can be understood largely independently of what happens at other scales, and this in 
turn leads us to think of interactions at one scale as at a different level than interactions at 
other scales5.      
 
3 Space precludes detailed discussion of Wimsatt’s rich and hugely influential early 
discussion of levels (e.g. 1994), which includes all of the possibilities I discuss and much 
more. As will be apparent from his paper in this volume, I share with Wimsatt the view 
that levels are (sometimes) real features of nature as well as his emphasis on the roles of 
independence and causal interaction in delimiting levels. I also agree that notions of level 
can be analytically very useful both in scientific theorizing itself and in philosophical 
reflection on science. 
4 Some writers, such as Craver and Bechtel also think of properties or “activities” as 
related by “compositional relations”. I regard this as problematic, for reasons described 
below.  
5 This notion of level as tied to independence (or near or relative independence) is also, I 
think, the primary notion motivating Simon’s notion of near decomposability, discussed 
in Wimsatt’s paper in this volume.  
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As an illustration consider that, for the purposes of understanding what is going 
on within the nucleus and phenomena such as radioactive decay, two of the four 
fundamental forces—the strong and weak nuclear forces—are crucial. These forces are 
very strong at very short spatial scales. Gravity, another fundamental force, is effectively 
irrelevant for most purposes in modeling nuclear behavior. On the other hand if we are 
interested in explaining/understanding chemical behavior—how atoms combine and form 
molecules and compounds—the strong and weak nuclear forces are effectively irrelevant 
and yet another force—the electromagnetic force—plays a central explanatory role. In 
many cases, this separation of levels or scales—the fact that nature permits us to 
construct theories that explain aspects of nuclear behavior that appeal to factors that are 
different from those that are required to explain chemical behavior, so that we can do 
nuclear physics without doing chemistry and vice versa—is crucial for successful 
science. For one thing, without such separation, constructing models of many phenomena 
would be computationally intractable. This yields one reason why a notion of level is 
sometimes important in science.  
What do we mean when we say for most explanations of chemical behavior, we 
don’t need to invoke information of nuclear forces? Of course if those forces were 
sufficiently different, stable nuclei (and atoms) would not exist. So we don’t mean that 
facts about those forces are completely irrelevant to chemical behavior. Rather (I suggest) 
what we have in mind is something like this: for purposes of chemistry, whatever is 
relevant about such forces can be represented by the values of a small number of 
variables, having to do, e.g., with the mass and charge of the nucleus. Conditional on the 
values of such variables, additional more detailed information about the inner goings on 
of the nucleus is irrelevant to chemical behavior. So the notion of independence in play 
here is really a notion of conditional independence.   
More generally, suppose that some of values of variable X are causally relevant to  
(not causally independent of) the values of variable Y but it that it is also the case that 
there is some variable or set of variables Z constructable from X by some coarse-graining 
operation which we can think of as representing the aggregate impact of the Zs) of much 
smaller dimensionality than X such that given the values of Z, additional variation in the 
values of X makes no further difference to the values of Y6. In such cases I will say that X 
is conditionally independent of Y, given the values of Z.  (As will become clear in Section 
8 which spells out this notion in more detail, conditional independence here is not 
conditional probabilistic independence but should be understood in terms of 
interventionist counterfactuals.) Such conditional independence allows us to appeal just 
to Z in explaining Y. For example, conditional on the value of the temperature of a gas, 
further variations in the kinetic energy of the individual molecules that are consistent 
with this temperature make, to a first approximation, no further difference to the pressure 
of the gas or to the values taken by certain other thermodynamic variables. When, as for 
these thermodynamic variables, this sort of conditional independence holds, we often find 
 
6 One of the simplest possibilities for such aggregation is some form of averaging as in 
the thermodynamic example mentioned immediately below. It is important to understand 
however that there are much more complicated possibilities, including in particular forms 
of aggregation that take into account or represent information about spatial or temporal 
correlations. These are discussed in Batterman’s paper in this volume.  
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it natural to say that those variables are at the “same level” and, moreover, at a level that 
is “different” from the variables used to characterize the individual molecules that make 
up the gas.  
It is important to understand that this second basis for level talk (which 
interactions are important and which either can be entirely ignored or subsumed into 
other, lower dimensional variables) is conceptually quite different from the composition 
based notion of level or from notions tied directly to size considerations. Whether one 
object A is part of another B is obviously a distinct question from whether features of A 
are irrelevant, unconditionally or conditionally, to the behavior of B. Nuclei are “parts” of 
molecules and nucleons are parts of nuclei but, as noted above, detailed information 
about nuclear forces between nucleons can be safely ignored in understanding the 
chemical behavior of molecules. Electrons are also parts of molecules but those aspects 
of the behavior of electrons that have to do with electromagnetic forces are crucial to 
understanding chemical behavior.  
Of course composition/size based considerations and independence considerations 
are frequently related—the various components of a cell commonly interact more 
strongly with one another (are not independent with respect to one another, even given 
further information about some relatively small number of variables) than they do with 
the more distant components of other cells (the effects of which may be usefully 
represented by means of some small number of variables). Nonetheless composition 
relations and relations of independence/dependence only imperfectly track one another: 
Entities that are small in size relative to larger entities (or that are roughly the same size 
as components of those larger entities) can affect those larger entities: viruses and 
bacteria can contribute to the defeat of armies. Conversely (I shall argue) properties 
possessed by larger entities can causally affect properties of smaller entities including 
properties of  smaller entities that are components of those larger entities, as when the 
potential difference across a neuronal membrane affects the behavior of the ion channels 
that are part of the membrane—see Section 5.   
 
2.3.  Levels and  Tractability. A third notion (often tied, however, to the  
independence- based notion 2.2. above) ties “level” to considerations having to do with 
computational and epistemic tractability. Roughly speaking, two sets of variables (or 
phenomena characterized in terms of those variables) S1 and S2 will be at different levels 
in this sense when there are computational and other sorts of epistemic barriers to 
modeling or explaining systems that can be characterized by one set of variables (e.g., S1) 
and relations among them in terms of variables and relationships from the other set (e.g., 
S2). For example, because of such barriers multi-compartment models of fine-grained 
aspects of neuronal behavior cannot be aggregated to produce tractable models of whole 
neurons. In this respect the two kinds of models and the relationships to which they 
appeal are at different “levels”—see Section 9 for additional discussion. A closely related 
point is that some variables are only well-defined or measurable at certain levels.7  
 
7 A common illustration: the usual thermodynamic notion of temperature of a gas is only 
applicable to a collection of molecules at equilibrium—it is not well-defined for an 
individual molecule. Similarly, in connection with the Hodgkin-Huxley model in Section  
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3. Interventionism and Downward Causation 
 
To talk about causal relationships between “levels” we require an account of 
causation. I will assume an interventionist account: X causes Y when there is some 
possible intervention that changes the value of X and, along with this, there is an 
associated change in the value of Y that occurs in a “regular” or “uniform” way. Here  
“regular” means that in some range of background circumstances, the intervention setting 
the value of X= x is either followed by the same value of Y or the same stable probability 
distribution for the values of Y. When X is at a “higher” level than Y, and this pattern of 
dependency obtains between X and Y, X downward causes Y. (Obviously in 
characterizing downward causation in this way, we are not assuming a notion of level 
according to which variables that are causally related are automatically assumed to be at 
the same level—instead we are assuming some other notion of level such as a 
composition-based notion.) This how many scientists who make use of the notion of 
downward causation understand this notion. For example George Ellis (2016) writes:  
  
One demonstrates the existence of top-down causation whenever manipulating a 
higher-level variable can be shown to reliably change lower level variables. (16)  
 
We can further flesh out the idea of a “reliable” or regular change in Y under an 
intervention on X in the following way.8 Assume that the upper-level variable X has a 
number of different lower level “realizers.” For example, if T is the temperature of a gas, 
many different possible arrangements of gas molecules, characterized in terms of the 
values of position and momentum variables for each of the molecules composing the gas, 
will realize the same value of this temperature.9 Thus a manipulation of an upper-level 
variable such as T which sets it to some value t can have lots of different possible 
realizations, corresponding to many different possible arrangements of gas molecules.    
However, for this manipulation to have a reliable (or uniform) effect on some second 
variable Y, we require that all of the different realizations of t (or almost all of them—see 
Sections 8-9) should have the same uniform effect on Y, where again this means that they 
lead to the same value for Y or the same probability distribution for Y. In other words, 
given that T is set to the value t, it should not matter how that value is realized by the 
values of the associated lower level variable as far as the effect of T=t on Y is 
concerned—the effect of T=t on Y should be in this sense “realization-independent.”  If 
this condition is not met, T will not count as a cause (top-down or otherwise) of Y. This 
 
5, the membrane potential  is only defined (and measurable) as a feature of the whole 
membrane.    
8 Ellis (2016) imposes a similar condition.  
9 Realization is thus a relation between the values of an upper-level variable and various 
values of a lower-level variable with many different values of the latter mapped into a 
single value of the former. It is not a relation between an upper-level variable and many 
lower-level variables. Realization is present when  values of a lower lever variables are 
averaged to yield a value for an upper level variable but as noted above averaging is not 
the only form that realization can take.  
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condition thus excludes “ambiguous” manipulations of candidate cause variables which 
have different effects depending on how the cause variable is realized (cf. Spirtes and 
Scheines 2004). As we shall see in Section 8, this non-ambiguity requirement is a 
particular instance of the more general conditional independence requirement mentioned 
previously.  
There are additional conditions that also must be met for downward causation to 
be present. One particularly important condition is that the putative cause and effect 
variables must be distinct in the right way—this condition is discussed in Section 6. 
Within an interventionist framework it is also important, as Ellis specifies, that the causal 
relata X and Y are variables10 where the mark of a variable is that it can assume several 
different values.11 Variables include quantities like mass, position, voltage and current 
but they can also be binary or two-valued. According to interventionism, only variables 
can stand in causal relationships: we haven’t clearly specified what causal relationships 
we are talking about until we have specified the variables they involve. It is crucial to 
distinguish variables from things or entities. To anticipate an example discussed below,  
ion channels and cell membranes are things, not variables and thus cannot literally stand 
in causal relationships. However, it is typically things or entities that stand in part/whole 
or compositional relationships. This is one reason why, within an interventionist 
framework and quite apart from further subtleties about causation, downward or 
otherwise, talk of wholes causing their parts seems incoherent—wholes and parts are 
things and hence cannot stand in causal relationships. Variables associated with wholes 
and parts can sometimes stand in causal relationships but, as we shall see, this needn’t 
involve an objectionable kind of whole/part causation.12  
 
4. Downward Causation Exemplified  
 
 
10 Recall that this is shorthand for whatever in the world corresponds to variables or 
values of variables.    
11  For more on variables and values of variables, see Woodward (2015; 2016; 
forthcoming).  
12  I believe the conditions described are necessary for downward causation but I doubt 
that they are jointly sufficient. Although I lack space for detailed discussion, there is a 
natural candidate for an additional condition which is motivated by the fact that it seems 
possible for a variable to satisfy the conditions above and yet to be highly distributed,  
non-compact or not simply connected and to not correspond to anything that we could 
measure or manipulate by upper level measurement and manipulation procedures. The 
additional condition would require that the upper-level variable not have this character—
intuitively, that it exhibit a certain kind of coherence, as when placing a gas in a heat bath 
has a coherent, coordinated effect on its component molecules. I won’t try to explore this 
idea further, since I don’t know how to state it precisely and in any case this additional 
condition seems to be satisfied in all of the examples of downward causation discussed 
below.   
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  Here are some putative examples of top-down causation—some drawn from 
recent books13 and some from other sources. 
4.1) The use of mean field theories in which the combined action of many atoms 
on a single atom is represented by means of an effective potential V rather than by means 
of a representation of each individual atom and their interaction. Intuitively, V is at a 
higher level than the atom on which it acts (Clark and Lancaster 2017). 
4. 2) The influence of environmental variables including social relations involving 
whole animals on gene expression within those animals as when manipulating the 
position of a monkey within a status hierarchy changes gene expression controlling 
serotonin levels within individual monkeys. Here position within a social hierarchy is 
thought of (perhaps on the basis of compositional considerations) at a higher level than 
gene expression affecting serotonin levels.   
4.3) A red hot sword is plunged into cold water and this alters the meso-level 
structure of the steel in the sword—cracks, dislocations, and grains in the sword. The 
treatment of the sword—heating and cooling—is at a higher level than these mesoscopic 
changes14 and the former downward causes the latter. (Example due to Bob Batterman.)     
4.4) Energy cascades. When a fluid is stirred in such a way that it exhibits large 
scale turbulent motion this motion is gradually transferred to motion at smaller scales– 
from large scale eddies to much smaller scale eddies. The large-scale motion may be on 
the scale of many meters, the small-scale motions on the scale of a millimeter where they 
are eventually dissipated as heat. Viscosity related effects dominate at this smaller scale 
but are less important at larger scales. (Example due to Mark Wilson.)  
 
5. The Hodgkin- Huxley Model as an Example of Downward Causation.  
 
Each of the previous examples is worth extended discussion but to keep things 
tractable I will largely focus on just one additional example  – the Hodgkin-Huxley (H-H) 
model of the action potential. This describes the factors causally affecting the overall 
shape of the action potential within an individual neuron. For reasons of space I will not 
describe the model in detail but the basic idea is that the neuron can be understood as a 
parallel circuit consisting of a capacitor which stores charge (the potential V across the  
neuronal membrane functions as a capacitor), a channel that conducts the sodium current 
INa, with an associated time and voltage dependent conductance gNa, a channel that 
conducts a potassium current IK with time and voltage dependent conductance gK, and a 
leakage current Il which is assumed to be time and voltage independent.  Since the 
channels are “part” of the cell membrane (they are embedded in it, so that the membrane 
is, at least on a compositional understanding of levels, at a “higher” level than the 
channels) and the behavior of the channels, including their conductances, is influenced by 
(among other factors) the potential difference V across the entire membrane, this looks 
like a plausible case of top-down causation and indeed it is described as such by, e.g., 
Denis Noble (2006). For future reference we should also note that according to this 
model, the potential difference V across the cell membrane is itself causally changed by 
 
13  Valuable recent discussions of downward causation with many additional examples 
include Ellis (2016) and Noble (2006).    
14 The heating and cooling affect the whole sword, not just components of it.  
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the various currents that occur in the ionic channels—as these change over time (and with 
different time courses), the total current I changes (in an apparent case of bottom-up 
causation) and V also changes, with these changes in V again changing the ion currents. It 
is this temporally extended pattern of mutual influence that accounts for the action 
potential. However, despite this apparent causal cycle, the fact that the ion channels are 
part of the cell membrane, and what is arguably the presence of downward causation, the 
HH model looks an intelligible causal representation—indeed one that is generally taken 
to be correct. How (if at all) can we make sense of this?   
 
6. Downward Causation and Distinctness of the Causal Relata 
 
As noted earlier one objection to downward causation is that this involves wholes 
acting on their parts. This is thought to be objectionable because causes and effects must 
be “distinct” and wholes and parts are not sufficiently distinct to stand in causal 
relationships. (Objections of this sort can be found in Bechtel and Craver 2007; Heil, 
2017 and many others.)      
What is meant by distinctness in this context? David Lewis’ views are 
representative of a common understanding of this notion:    
 
[For C to cause E] C and E must be distinct events—and distinct not only in the 
sense of nonidentity but also in the sense of nonoverlap and nonimplication. It 
won’t do to say that my speaking this sentence causes my speaking this 
sentence or that my speaking the whole of it causes my speaking the first 
half of it; or that my speaking causes my speaking it loudly, or vice 
versa. (2000, 78) 
 
As this quotation suggests, the tendency in the philosophical literature has been to try to 
understand the relevant notion of distinctness in terms of the absence of logical 
relationships (non-implication) or the absence of part/whole relations (spatial or 
temporal) and similar considerations, which leads immediately to the conclusion that 
wholes cannot cause their spatial or temporal parts because of a failure of distinctness.  
For example, the individual H20 molecules making up a body of water are parts or  
constituents of that body and one might object, as Heil (2017) does, to the claim that the 
position or motion of the whole body causes the position or motion of one of its 
molecular constituents on the grounds that these relata are not sufficiently distinct to 
stand in a causal relationship.15 Similarly, Bechtel and Craver (2007) consider cases in 
which some temporally extended process is present which has a subprocess as temporal 
proper part or constituent and object to the claim the former can exert a causal influence 
on the former. To use their example, because “the change in the conformation of 
rhodopsin is a stage in the signal transduction pathway in visual perception, the change in 
 
15 How does Heil’s claim fit with the existence of energy cascades described in 4.4? Heil 
objects to whole/part causation but, to anticipate my discussion below, this is irrelevant to 
4.4 since the transfer of energy from larger to smaller eddies takes time, so that the 
relation between the latter and the former is not a synchronic part/whole relationship. 
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conformation cannot be a cause of signal transduction” (p. 552). For similar reasons they 
object to the claim that a mechanism considered as whole (that is as a collection of parts 
or constituents standing in ordinary causal relations with each other) can exert downward 
causation on the parts or constituents of that mechanism.    
I agree with these claims (about the absence of downward causation in these 
examples) but do not think that the complaint of failure of distinctness among causal 
relata applies to the top-down relationship in the HH model or the other examples 
described in Section 4.  In other words, the relationship between V in the HH model and 
the behavior of the ion channels is not like the relationship between a body of water and 
its constituent molecules or like the relationship a whole mechanism and its parts. To 
spell this out, suppose that P is a spatial or temporal part of W and let X be some variable 
that characterizes some feature of W and Y some variable that characterizes some feature 
of P. Then I claim that it is entirely possible for X and Y to be distinct in a way that allows 
for X to cause Y despite the parthood relationship between P and W.  Indeed in some such 
cases, it may make no sense to think of the variable Y as a part of X or as logically or 
semantically related to it in a way that precludes causation. For example, the ionic 
conductances g don’t seem in any intuitive sense to be “part” of  the variable V—it is hard 
to understand what this could possibly mean.16 More importantly even if one thinks of 
this relationship in terms of parts and wholes, these variables don’t seem to exhibit the 
kind of failure of distinctness that variables like “saying hello” and “saying hello loudly” 
do. Similarly, variables describing the mesoscopic structure of the sword in (4.3) not are 
in any obvious sense “part” of the variable that describes how the sword has been heated 
and cooled.  
In saying this, I don’t mean to deny that variables can fail to be distinct in ways 
that preclude their standing in causal relationships—the concern about failures of 
distinctness is a legitimate worry. My point is rather that the usual ways of trying to 
characterize the kinds of failures of distinctness that matter for causal relatedness in terms 
of logical or mereological relations don’t work very well. Here is a first pass at a proposal 
about distinctness that seems natural within an interventionist framework and which I 
have defended elsewhere (Woodward 2015). The proposal is that variables are 
appropriately distinct (and thus suitable candidates for standing in a causal relationship as 
far as distinctness considerations go) when they satisfy a condition of independent 
fixability (IF):      
 
(IF) A set of variables V satisfies independent fixability of values if and only if   
for each value it is possible for a variable to take individually, it is “possible” to 
set the variable to that value via an intervention, concurrently with each of the 
other variables in V also being set to any of its individually possible values by 
 
16 Craver does attempt to elucidate what it is for one “activity” to be “constitutively 
relevant” to another by appealing to a “mutual manipulability” criterion. I lack space for 
discussion but notice that the relationship between V and the channel conductances 
appears to satisfy Craver’s criterion, which implies (in my view mistakenly) that the 
relationship between them is constitutive rather than causal. Moreover, systems with 
causal cycles appear to satisfy Craver’s criterion even though they involve causal 
relationships.  
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independent interventions.  Here “possible” includes settings of values of 
variables that are possible in terms of the assumed, logical, mathematical, or 
semantic relations among the variables as well as certain structural or space-state 
relationships.    
 
Thus “possible” in IF should not be understood as restricted to combinations of settings 
that are causally possible, although of course if settings are causally co-possible they are 
possible tout court. For example, in the usual state-space formulation of mechanics, the 
three-dimensional position and momentum components of each of a collection of 
particles at a time as well as the components for the same particle at different times are 
regarded as independently fixable, even though, once dynamical considerations are 
introduced, certain combinations of these may be causally excluded. Obviously IF draws 
upon (and does not explicate) some antecedently understood notion of possibility that is 
broader than causal possibility. What IF adds is a focus on whether operations involving 
setting of variables to values are co-possible—this turns out to be crucial.   
To further illustrate (IF), consider Lewis’ example of saying “hello” and saying 
“hello” loudly. Expressed in terms of variables, suppose that X has two values (x1= saying 
hello loudly, x2 = doing something other than saying hello loudly) and Y has values y1 = 
saying hello, y2 = not saying hello.) Then the values x1 and y2 are not co-possible and there 
is a failure of distinctness.  Notice that using (IF) to reach this conclusion does not 
require the assumption that saying hello is a “part” or a “constituent” of saying hello 
loudly (whatever that might mean) although it does require a judgment that it is   in the 
relevant sense not  possible (presumably because of logical or semantic relationships) to 
say hello loudly without saying hello17. As another illustration, position and momentum 
for an individual particle satisfy independent fixability (and hence are distinct), even 
though some may find it tempting to argue that there is a logical or part/whole relation 
between these variables (since momentum is the product of mass and the time derivative 
of position). As this last example illustrates, (IF) does not depend on our being able to 
make sense of constitutive relations among variables and does not always yield the same 
conclusions as this last notion.  
 
17 Older readers may remember “logical connection” arguments that claimed to show that 
desires and beliefs were “logically connected” to associated actions and hence not 
sufficiently distinct to serve as causes of them—e.g., the desire D to drink beer could not 
cause drinking beer B because of a “logical connection” between the two. A consensus 
eventually emerged that this was a flawed argument—despite the alleged logical 
connection between D and B, D can cause B. I see this as illustrating the dangers of 
relying on unclear ideas about logical connection and overlap in trying to elucidate 
distinctness among variables. Note that IF yields the correct judgment about this case: all 
of the different values of D and B are compossible: one can have the desire to drink beer 
without drinking, one can drink without the desire (e.g., out of a feeling of social 
obligation) and so on. Of course if it is claimed that whenever one drinks, it follows a 
priori one has the desire (i.e. that drinking without the desire is excluded on conceptual 
grounds) , (IF) will yield the conclusion that the relation is not causal, but this seems the 
correct assessment.  
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If we apply (IF) to the HH model, the question we should ask is whether V, the 
putative top down cause, and the channel conductances and ionic currents, the putative 
effects of V, are distinct in a way that satisfies (IF). The answer to this question is “yes.” 
First V is clearly manipulable in a way that is independent of the values taken by the 
conductances or ionic currents. This does not require questionable judgments about non-
causal forms of possibility: it is shown by some of the experiments that were used by 
Hodgkin and Huxley to establish their model. These involved the use of a newly invented 
device called a “voltage camp.” This enabled the experimenters to impose a stable 
potential difference (at various levels they were able to choose) across the cell membrane 
in a way that depended only on the value set by the clamp. The clamp thus functioned as 
an (arrow-breaking) intervention device, with the membrane potential difference fixed by 
the device rather than by such endogenous causes as the operation of the ion channels. 
This allowed the experimenters to see and investigate (isolate) the effect of V on the ionic 
currents and conductances in a way that confirmed the predictions of the HH model.   
Similarly, various molecular interventions are possible that alter the individual ionic 
channel currents and conductances independently of V when the clamp device is used and 
these again show behavior in accord with the HH model.   
   I claim that this independent manipulability, as captured by (IF) suffices to 
show that it is legitimate to think of V, and the channel currents and conductances as 
sufficiently distinct to stand in causal relationships. A similar analysis applies to the other 
examples in Section 4. More generally, the fact that claims of top-down causation often 
involve claims that variables that are predicated of wholes causally affect variables that 
are predicted of parts of those wholes is consistent with those variables being sufficiently 
distinct in the sense of IF to stand in causal relationships.  
 
7. Causal Cycles 
 
I noted above that the HH model appears to involve a causal cycle, at least if we 
confine ourselves to the variables employed in the model. A similar observation holds for 
many other putative examples of downward causation; often (not always) when an upper-
level variable U is claimed to act on lower-level variable L, the value of U (perhaps at 
some later time) will result (causally) from the action of lower-level variables. For 
example, the position of a monkey in a dominance hierarchy causally affects the animal’s 
serotonin level but that level in turn affects position in the hierarchy—something that can 
be demonstrated by exogenously increasing an animal’s serotonin level pharmaceutically 
with the result that the animal rises in the hierarchy. 
One possible response to worries about cyclicity is to say that “underlying” any 
cyclic graph is a model with time-indexed variables with temporal lags that is acyclic. If 
these temporal lags (or the difference between the values of Xt and X t+1) do not matter to 
the effects we are trying to capture then the use of a cyclical representation may be 
unproblematic. For example, in the HH model, the response of the ion channel 
conductances to a change in voltage across the cell membrane (or more accurately, to a 
change in the membrane at some distance from the channels) is not instantaneous, 
although this fact is not represented in the HH model. It is plausible that this temporal 
delay makes no difference to the generic shape of the action potential which is why the 
model is successful despite omitting such information.  
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The issues around how to interpret graphs with cycles are complex, and I don’t 
claim that time-indexing is always a satisfactory treatment. (Rather different cases require 
different treatments, and there are a number of subtleties that I lack space to discuss.) It is 
worth noting, however, that graphs with cycles sometimes have a straightforward 
interventionist interpretation along the “usual arrow breaking” lines. That is, one way of 
interpreting a bi-directional graph  
 
(7.1) U ↔ L  
 
is as follows: (i) if we were to intervene on U, this would break the arrow directed into U 
from L while preserving the arrow directed out of U into L, thus replacing (7.1) with the 
following structure. 
 
(7.2) U → L  
 
If this interpretation correctly describes the causal facts, one would expect L to change as 
indicated under this intervention on U. Moreover, if one were to intervene on L, this 
would break the arrow from U directed into L, while preserving the arrow from L into U 
so that under this intervention  (7.2) is replaced with   
 
(7.3) L → U 
 
Again if (7.3) is correct, U should change under this intervention on L.   
In fact, as already noted, this is essentially what was done as part of the 
experimental confirmation of the HH model. The use of the voltage clamp constitutes an 
arrow breaking intervention on V and one looks to see whether under such an intervention 
on V the channel conductances and currents respond in the way described by the 
equations, which they in fact do. Similarly, interventions on the channel conductances 
and currents followed by measurement of V can establish the existence of a causal 
relationship running upwards from these to V. Thinking of these results as implied by 
(7.1) thus provides a coherent interpretation of that graph. In the case of the relationship 
between status and serotonin levels we can take a monkey with currently low status and 
move him to another less competitive troop where because of his abilities he will rise to a 
higher status (suppose he is bigger than all of the monkeys in the second troop and 
smaller than many in the first troop) and observe the predicted increase in serotonin 
levels which provides evidence for top down U → L causation. As noted above we can 
also change his serotonin levels by an exogenous pharmaceutical intervention and 
observe the resulting change in his status. For any given monkey, his serotonin level and 
his status in the absence of such interventions or after the effects of the interventions have 
been allowed to equilibrate will presumably reflect the joint operation of processes 
operating in both causal directions in which case the bi-directional graph may be 
particularly appropriate.  
It is sometimes claimed that the cyclic graphs are inconsistent with the 
directionality or asymmetry of causal relationships. It seems to me that this conflates two 
issues. It is plausible that causal claims have a kind of directionality built into them and 
this mandates the use of directed (rather than undirected) graphs to represent such 
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relationships. However a graph can be directed while still containing cycles.   
 
8. Conditional Independence 
 
In Section 2 I briefly introduced a notion of conditional independence. In this 
section I spell this notion out in more detail and relate it to my previous discussion, 
explaining how it bears on notions of level and downwards causation.  
I begin with an “ideal” case.18 Suppose that we have a set of variables Li with very 
high dimensionality that are causally relevant (by the standard interventionist criterion of 
relevance) to some explanandum E (or set of explananda Ei), which may be either upper 
or lower level. Suppose also there is a set of upper level variables Uk of much smaller 
dimensionality with the following property: interventions on the values of Uk are also 
causally relevant to the E and, furthermore, conditional on the values of the Uk  when 
these are fixed by interventions, further variations in the values of the Li, produced by 
independent interventions, make no difference to (are irrelevant to) the values of E. In a 
bit more detail, let us say that the variables Li are unconditionally relevant (alternatively, 
irrelevant or independent) to E if there are some (no) changes in the values of each Li  
when produced by interventions that are associated with changes in E. A set of variables 
Li is irrelevant to variable E conditional on additional variables Uk if the Li are 
unconditionally relevant to E, the Uk  are unconditionally relevant to E, and conditional on 
the values of Uk  when these are fixed by interventions, changes in the value of Li 
produced by interventions and consistent with these values for Uk  are irrelevant to E.19 If 
it is possible to find such a set of variables Uk (and perhaps also if they meet certain 
additional conditions of the sort gestured at in footnote 7) we can replace the Li with them 
insofar as we are just interested in describing difference-making relationships bearing on 
E—that is, identifying those variables’ variations which make a difference for E. The Uk 
do just as good a job as the Li  in this respect. And of course identifying such difference-
making relationships is what explanation and causal analysis is all about according to the 
interventionist.  
Examples that look roughly like this are quite common. To return to an example 
mentioned briefly in Section 2, suppose we are interested in explaining the macroscopic 
behavior of a gas as characterized by such variables as temperature, pressure and volume   
A given temperature t for the gas will correspond to or can be realized by any one of a 
very large number of collections of molecules with different positions and momenta—six 
such variables for each molecule in the gas, so that this variable has over 1024 
independent dimensions. But (except for a measure zero set of cases) the impact of any of 
these profiles on the macroscopic variables depends entirely on their aggregate or average 
behavior which is summarized by the values of the thermodynamic variables. Given the 
values of the macroscopic variables further details having to do with the exact positions 
 
18 For a closely related set of ideas, see Chalupka et al. (2017). What follows has been 
substantially influenced by this paper and by discussion with Frederick Eberhardt.  
19 In other words, we are to imagine that the value of Uk = u is fixed by an intervention, 
while the value of Li is set via interventions to any value which is consistent with u. If 
conditional independence holds, these further variations in Li  should have no influence on 
E.  
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and momenta of the individual molecules are conditionally irrelevant to many aspects of 
the behavior of the gas.   
Similarly, suppose, as the HH model in effect claims, that as an empirical matter,  
given the value of the overall membrane potential V, further lower-level detail captured 
by lower-level variables (e.g., variables describing the fields associated with the 
individual atoms and molecules making up the membrane) is conditionally irrelevant to 
the shape of the action potential, the gating behavior of the ion channels and so on.20 To 
the extent this is true, we may legitimately appeal just to V to explain these explananda.  
Under these conditions, V is a legitimate downward cause.  
 
9. Levels and Conditional Independence. 
 
How does all this relate to assignments of levels? In the case of the gas we have a 
rationale for treating the thermodynamic variables as at the “same” level, since the right 
sort of conditional independence relation holds among them and separates them from 
“lower level” information about the position and momenta of individual molecules. In 
addition, compositional considerations reinforce this assignment of levels. In contrast, in 
the case of the HH model, compositional and perhaps other considerations suggest that 
the causal relata (V and the channel conductances) are at different “levels,” even though 
there is interaction between these levels. But the underlying logic is the same: it is 
legitimate to treat (in the right sort of set up) temperature as a cause of pressure because a 
given value of temperature as uniform effect on other thermodynamic variables like 
pressure (uniform in the sense that given that value, further variations in molecular 
arrangements realizing the temperature make no difference to those thermodynamic 
variables) and it is legitimate to treat V rather than some more detailed description of the 
potential differences resulting from the exact arrangement of electrons along the cell 
membrane as a cause of aspects of the behavior of the ion channels because the different 
realizations of V have a similarly uniform effect on that behavior.  
Several additional remarks may help to clarify how the conditional independence 
idea is to be understood. Note first that it is relativized to a particular target explanandum 
(or perhaps a set of these). Variables L may be independent of explanandum E 
conditional on the values of variables U but L may not be independent of some other 
explanandum E* conditional on U, so that if we wish to account for E* we do need to 
take the values of L into account. For example, if we wish to account for facts about the 
specific heats of gas, we must advert to quantum mechanical considerations rather than to 
macroscopic variables like pressure and temperature. Similarly, if our target 
explanandum is the overall shape of action potential, then conditional on the variables 
employed in the HH model, further information about molecular details may be irrelevant 
but if we wish to explain other features of the system such as the behavior of dendritic 
trees, this particular conditional independence relation will no longer hold (cf. Herz  
2006).   
In practice, as some of the examples already discussed suggest, there are often 
natural groupings of variables for which the same conditional independence relations 
 
20 Note what this claim says. It does not say that there are no local variations in the 
potential; it says that they do not matter for the explananda of interest.  
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hold—e.g., conditional independence of various explananda characterized in terms of 
thermodynamic variables from lower level molecular detail holds conditional on other 
thermodynamic variables, so that these variables form a natural grouping. This is one 
basis on which we group whole sets of variables into “levels.”    
Second, note the form taken by the conditional independence justification of the 
use of upper-level variables. It is common in the philosophical literature for defenses of 
upper-level causal claims or explanations to attempt to show that such explanations are 
superior to explanations in terms of lower-level variables and, moreover, superior in a 
way that is completely independent of “pragmatic” considerations having to do with 
human epistemic and calculational limitations.21 The conditional independence 
justification does not claim this. Rather what it attempts to do is to identify conditions 
under which it is permissible or legitimate to employ upper-level variables—permissible 
in the sense that this can be done without explanatory loss. There is no claim that an 
explanation in terms of lower-level variables (if we could produce one, which is 
frequently not the case22) would be inferior to an explanation in terms of upper-level 
variables.      
Third, the condition described above, involving complete irrelevance of the lower 
level variables to certain explananda conditional on the values of the upper level 
variables, is obviously a kind of limiting case, although it is arguably not as rare as some 
philosophers suppose. The requirement of complete irrelevance may be relaxed in various 
ways.23 We might require instead that the Li be irrelevant to E conditional on Uk for most 
or “almost all” values of these variables or for values of those variables that are most 
likely to occur (perhaps around here right now). We might require that for those values of 
Li for which exact conditional irrelevance fails, near conditional irrelevance or 
independence holds—most, even if not all, of the variance in E explained by Li is 
explained by Uk. We might think in terms of conditional irrelevance holding on some 
appropriate time or spatial or energy scale even if not on others—for example, perhaps 
there are very fast variations in Li occurring on a very fine-grained temporal scale that 
can make a difference to E even conditional on the values of the upper-level variables but 
the Li very quickly settle down to constant equilibrium values which have an upper level 
representation for which conditional irrelevance holds.24   
 My argument so far has been that considerations about conditional independence 
can be invoked to explain why it is permissible or legitimate to formulate causal claims in 
 
21 For recent claims of this sort see Weslake, 2010 and Franklin-Hall, 2016.  
22 See my discussion below.   
23 Of course, to the extent that we do this, we allow for manipulations that are in some 
respects ambiguous, so there is a trade-off around these considerations.  
24 It is an important general fact about independence and conditional independence 
relations that they can be scale or grain relative in the sense that switching to different 
temporal or length scales or adopting certain procedures for aggregating lower-level 
variables can replace situations in which variables are dependent with situations in which 
related upper–level variables are independent or conditionally independent. For example,  
X might be correlated with Y on a very long time scale but if relatively short time scales 
are what are relevant to the behavior of interest it may be appropriate to treat X as 
constant, in which case it will be independent of Y. 
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terms of upper-level variables, including causal claims that involve lower-level variables 
as effects—we may lose little or nothing by doing so in terms of the identification of 
difference-making factors for the effects in question. Moreover, such considerations 
provide one important basis for grouping variables into levels and for understanding 
when it is legitimate to collapse lower-level variables into more coarse-grained upper-
level variables with fewer degrees of freedom. However, of course there is more to the 
story about why we actually employ such upper-level variables. It is at this point that 
various sorts of limitations of us humans (and perhaps all bounded agents) come into the 
picture. Some of these are calculational—we can’t solve the 1023 body problem of 
calculating bottom up from the behavior of individual molecules to the aggregate 
behavior of the gas. In addition, we face the epistemic problem that we are unable to 
make the kinds of fine-grained measurements that would be required for such 
calculations to reach reliable results25.   
To take another example, although there are fine-grained neural models  
employing large numbers (up to 1000) of individual “compartments” (each of which 
represents a distinct circuit structure for a small portion of the neuron) that can be used to 
account for aspects of dendritic behavior and the role of neuronal spatial structure, these 
multi-compartment models cannot, for reasons of computational tractability, be 
“aggregated up” to produce a model of the whole neuron. For that we require a different 
model like the HH model which is a “single compartment” model that neglects the spatial 
structure of the neuron but nonetheless is adequate to explain the overall shape of the 
action potential.26 We thus find that not only is it permissible to formulate theories in 
terms of upper-level variables if we wish explain certain explananda but that we have 
often have no choice but to do this if we want models that are tractable or that we can 
 
25 Wimsatt makes the important point in correspondence that in the biological realm such 
computational and epistemic limitations influence what are the correct causal relations 
and not just how we model these. If an organism can only perceptually detect relatively 
coarse-grained differences in, say, a prey or predator because of such limitations, then it 
is these coarse-grained features that causally affect behavior, rather than some finer-
grained variable. My flight behavior is   causally sensitive just to whether the animal 
before me is a tiger, rather than to fine grained details of molecular realization.    
26 Cf. Herz et al (2006):  
  
Single-compartment models such as the classic Hodgkin-Huxley model neglect 
the neuron’s spatial structure and focus entirely on how its various ionic currents 
contribute to subthreshold behavior and spike generation. These models 
have led to a quantitative understanding of many dynamical phenomena including 
phasic spiking, bursting, and spike-frequency adaptation. 
 
This short paper is very interesting in its discussion of neuronal models at different 
“levels” and the way in which models at each level are able to capture some aspects of 
neuronal behavior and not others and how “abstraction” (which basically amounts to 
neglect of certain features of the neuron which are irrelevant to the behavior one is trying 
to understand) can lead to models that can account for aspects of higher level neuronal 
behavior that, for computational reasons, cannot be captured by lower level models.  
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calculate with. Put differently, we are sometimes in the fortunate situation that nature 
presents us with relations of conditional irrelevance/independence that we can then 
exploit to construct tractable models which would not otherwise be possible. When we 
build models and theories that exploit these opportunities, they will be structures in which 
upper-level causation appears. Note that although such computational considerations may 
reflect, at least in part, facts about us, the facts about conditional independence or near 
approximations to it which they exploit have to do with what nature is like—the latter are 
not just reflections of our computational limitations.  
Considerations having to do with calculational and epistemic constraints of the 
sort just described thus represent another set of considerations (briefly described under 
2.3 above) that influences judgments about levels. Among other considerations, models at 
different levels of detail may employ very different varieties of mathematical description 
that are difficult if not impossible to stich together smoothly with the consequence that 
we cannot straightforwardly extend models and theories that are successful in accounting 
for the behavior of systems at certain scales (or levels of detail) to behavior at other 
scales or levels of detail. For example, models at one level may employ partial 
differential equations (which may be used to capture the role of spatial structure), at 
another level ordinary differential equations (which may abstract away from spatial 
structure), at another level Boolean or structural equations (which will neglect the 
underlying dynamics described by the differential equations), and at still another level 
Bayesian representations in terms of probability theory.27 Thus we often end up with 
situations in which each of a variety of different kinds of models have their own 
distinctive explananda which they account for and other possible explananda which they 
cannot explain, either because the right sorts of conditional independence relations do not 
hold or for computational reasons or both. Again, this encourages us to think of such 
situations in terms of a separation into levels. The problem we then face is getting these 
levels to “talk to one another” when conditional independence partially fails28.  
  To relate these ideas to my earlier discussion of downward causation, consider 
the question of why we have a notion of downward causation at all and regard claims of 
downward causation as sometimes legitimate rather than (as some skeptics claim we 
should) insisting that the only true literally causal claims are those that relate   variables 
that are all at the same lower level. My answer is that (1) when the candidate top-down 
cause has a uniform effect on some other variable regardless of how it is realized, we lose 
nothing by describing the situation in terms of upper-level rather than lower-level 
variables and (2) for computational reasons, we may not be able to formulate  an account 
of the effect in terms of lower level variables in any case.   
Finally a brief remark about “autonomy”. This word is used in many ways but one 
natural meaning is that a framework or theory is autonomous or relatively so to the extent 
that one doesn’t need information coming from some other theory or level to adequately 
model some range of phenomena. For example, as  Batterman observes in his paper for 
 
27 Thus in Herz et al.’s (2006) catalog of different kinds of models, their level 1-3 models 
employ various kinds of differential equations while their level 5 models black box entire 
neurons and treat them as computing via Bayesian updating.  
28 Some strategies for dealing with this problem are discussed in detail in Batterman’s 
paper in this volume.  
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this volume, the Navier- Stokes equations are autonomous with respect to many 
explananda concerning fluid behavior in the sense that they account for those explananda 
without requiring information about the molecular details of the fluid. Obviously 
autonomy, when so understood is a relative or conditional notion in several senses. A 
theory  may be autonomous in its ability to account for one set of explananda but not 
others, as Batterman also observes. A theory may need a whole lot of information from 
some other source to be adequate  or it may need relatively little information,  perhaps   
of a very non-detailed generic sort.  To pick up on the quotation at the beginning of Sara 
Green’s paper, certain generic facts about cars and the behavior of their drivers may be 
relevant to modeling traffic flow, but not the details of the working of internal 
combustion engine. I think of my remarks about conditional independence as one 
possible way of capturing these ideas29.    
 
 
 10. Conclusion   
 
My remarks in the previous section attempt to provide a partial answer to the 
questions about the function of level talk in science posed in Section 1. In addition to the 
role played by compositional considerations, such talk can be motivated by empirical 
facts about conditional independence and by considerations having to do with what it is 
 
29 I cannot resist two further remarks. First, ideas related to conditional independence 
might be used to capture part of what may be meant by talk of “emergence” and in a way 
that renders that notion unmysterious. That certain lower level information is 
conditionally irrelevant to certain explananda should not be metaphysically puzzling and 
does not by itself imply the explananda are inexplicable in terms of the lower level 
information.  Second, traditionally discussions of autonomy have been closely bound up 
with issues about reduction. Fodor, for example, says that psychology is autonomous to 
the extent that it is not reducible to neurobiology, where by “reduction” he has in mind 
something like Nagelian reduction. Understanding autonomy in terms of conditional 
independence does not map onto Fodor’s picture in any simple way. If a psychological 
theory is fully type reducible to a true neurobiological theory, this would presumably 
mean that the psychological theory by itself was fully adequate in accounting for the 
psychological phenomena it was meant to explain since all the generalizations of the 
psychological theory follow from the true neurobiological theory. In this case the 
psychological theory would be autonomous in the sense I propose. Similarly, although 
multiple realizability is often taken to undermine the possibility of Nagelian reduction, it 
is compatible with autonomy in the sense described above. (Multiple realizability is also 
compatible with failure of autonomy if realization independence fails.) If on the other 
hand, the psychological theory was empirically inadequate by itself and required 
extensive supplementation or correction by neurobiological information in order to be 
adequate, the psychological theory would not be reducible to the neurobiological theory 
but it wouldn’t be autonomous either. What this shows is that the extent to which the 
relevant information in a lower level theory is captured by the categories in an upper 
level theory(so that additional input from the lower level theory is not required)  is very 
different from whatever is captured by Nagelian reduction.  
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possible to represent and calculate using various sorts of mathematical models. I see these 
factors as working together and interacting—the conditional independence facts create 
niches or opportunities for computationally tractable models which succeed in explaining 
certain effects in virtue of abstracting away from certain conditionally irrelevant factors  
at a more fine grained levels of analysis.30 In addition, ideas about levels can also play the 
useful heuristic role of providing plausibility arguments to theorists or modelers about 
which factors they may be able to ignore, prior to the construction of detailed models 
although of course such arguments always need to be checked empirically. These are all 
considerations that help to explain why it is sometimes justifiable and indeed salutary and 
advantageous to make use of level-based arguments and reasoning strategies.   
That said, we should also recognize the following complicating (and sometimes 
countervailing) considerations which suggest caution about too much reliance on level-
based considerations: First, finding cases in which conditional independence holds even 
approximately is (at least typically) not easy—it requires finding the “right” variables and 
the right strategies for representing the impact of high dimensional variables in lower 
dimensional ways. In some domains of inquiry, it may not be possible to find such 
variables at all (or at least variables that are well-behaved in the sense of being 
cognizable and measurable) —instead many different variables which we think of as at 
very different levels (where this is assessed in terms of compositional or other 
considerations) may all matter to the effects we are trying to explain, so that there is 
extensive “causal leakage”31 across levels.32 This does not make explanation impossible 
but it certainly makes it more difficult. In such cases, heuristics based in ideas about 
sharp separations of levels can mislead. 
We should also bear in mind that, as urged earlier, conditional independence facts 
are explanandum relative—from the fact we can legitimately neglect certain factors in 
accounting for certain explananda E, it does not follow that we can legitimately neglect 
those factors in accounting for some other explanandum E*, even if E* seems, intuitively 
similar to E or at the same level according to some notion of level such as one based on 
compositional considerations. Whether we can legitimately neglect such factors in 
accounting for E* is always an empirical issue, which cannot be settled a priori. We 
should be particularly sensitive to the possibility that conflations among different notions 
of level can lead us to assume conditional independence in cases in which it is not 
warranted, as when we assume that composition-based differences in level automatically 
warrant assumptions about conditional independence. 
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